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Abstract
Machine Learning as a Service (MLaaS) has become a growing trend in recent
years and several such services are currently offered. MLaaS is essentially a set
of services that provides machine learning tools and capabilities as part of cloud
computing services. In these settings, the cloud has pre-trained models that are
deployed and large computing capacity whereas the clients can use these models
to make predictions without having to worry about maintaining the models and
the service. However, the main concern with MLaaS is the privacy of the client’s
data.
Although there have been several proposed approaches in the literature to run ma-
chine learning models on encrypted data, the performance is still far from being
satisfactory for practical use. In this paper, we aim to accelerate the performance
of running machine learning on encrypted data using combination of Fully Homo-
morphic Encryption (FHE), Convolutional Neural Networks (CNNs) and Graph-
ics Processing Units (GPUs). We use a number of optimization techniques, and
efficient GPU-based implementation to achieve high performance. We evaluate
a CNN whose architecture is similar to AlexNet to classify homomorphically en-
crypted samples from the Cars Overhead With Context (COWC) dataset. To the
best of our knowledge, it is the first time such a complex network and large dataset
is evaluated on encrypted data. Our approach achieved reasonable classification
accuracy of 95% for the COWC dataset. In terms of performance, our results
show that we could achieve several thousands times speed up when we implement
GPU-accelerated FHE operations on encrypted floating point numbers.
1 Introduction
Deep learning algorithms based on Neural Networks (NN) have achieved remarkable results and
empowered a wide range of applications in different domains. However, building these models
require substantial domain expertise and computational resources which might not be available to
many organizations. Therefore, there has been an evolving trend toward using cloud services for
this purpose. With increasing growth of cloud services, several Machine Learning as a Service
(MLaaS) are offered where training and deploying machine learning models are performed on cloud
providers’ infrastructure. The machine learning models are deployed on the cloud and users can use
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these models to make predictions without having to worry about maintaining the models and the
service. However, organization may be reluctant to use MLaaS as it requires access to the raw data
which is often privacy sensitive and can raise security and privacy concerns. Our work is focused
on addressing these issues and the main objective is to provide secure privacy preserving machine
learning for such scenarios in an efficient and scalable manner.
There have been increasing recognition of this important issue in recent years and several approaches
have been proposed. Most of the proposed approaches can be categorized into three methods:
Trusted Computing Base (TCB), Secure Multi-Party Computation (SMC) and Fully Homomorphic
Encryption (FHE). TCBs such as Intel SoftwareGuard Extensions (SGX) or AMD Secure Encrypted
Virtualization (SEV) provide hardware-based primitives that enable us to execute private data and/or
code in shielded execution environments, called enclaves. SMC protocols are algorithmic solutions
based on cryptography techniques that jointly evaluate a function between multiple parties without
revealing any party’s private data. FHE allows one to evaluate a function on encrypted data and get
the encrypted result without decryption at any point during the computations.
TCB-based approaches are suitable for the cloud computing environments and are efficient [8]. How-
ever, it has been shown that several attacks can be devised to allow unprivileged programs to extract
content from memory that should only be accessible to privileged programs [9]. SMC-based ap-
proaches are interactive in nature and require a large amount of communications between the partic-
ipating parties, hence, they have huge communication overhead [6, 7]. FHE-based approaches are
similar to SMC-based approaches in that both are based on cryptography techniques but FHE-based
approaches are non-interactive [1-4]. FHE-based approaches, however, require a large amount of
computation and are considered computionally expensive. The main drawback of these FHE-based
approaches is the computational overhead. For instance, CryptoNets required 570 seconds to evalu-
ate a FHE-friendly model on encrypted samples from the MNIST dataset [1]. Although there have
been some improvements in this areas including our prior work [2-4], most of the work on FHE-
based approaches has been limited to small datasets such as MNIST and CIFAR-10 [1, 4, 14]. In
this work, we focus on accelerating the performance of running CNNs on encrypted data and making
it practical for larger datasets and more complex networks. Our main contribution is reducing the
overall computational overhead of FHE-based approaches using GPU-accelerated implementation.
In our previous work, we have developed privacy preserving MLaaS and have demonstraed its fea-
sibility. We have provided theoretical foundation to show that it is possible to find lowest degree
polynomial approximation of a function within a certain error range and provide an approach to gen-
erate those approximations [3, 4]. We have also implemented CNNs over encrypted data and shown
its applicability using datasets such as MNIST and CIFAR-10 [4]. Building upon on prior work, in
this work, we show that privacy-preserving deep learning is not only possible on GPUs but can also
be significantly accelerated and offers a way towards efficient scalable MLaaS.
2 Background
2.1 Fully Homomorphic Encryption
FHE schemes allow for computing arbitrary circuits over encrypted data [5]. FHE schemes achieve
this by taking a somewhat homomorphic encryption (SwHE) scheme that homomorphically evalu-
ate its own decryption function and some additional operations. This is necessary because during
the encryption process some noise is added to the data. This noise grows as more operations are
performed on the ciphertext. If the noise grows past a certain threshold, the ciphertext can no longer
be decrypted correctly. FHE schemes deal with this noise growth by using bootstrapping [5] which
resets the noise by homomorphically evaluating the decryption function. The main problem is that
bootstrapping is computationally expensive. Another approach of dealing with the noise growth is
by constructing a so called leveled fully homomorphic encryption scheme (LFHE). Here the param-
eters are chosen so that a certain number of computations can be performed before the noise passes
the threshold. This is only feasible for applications where the number of operations or an estimate
is known beforehand.
There are a number of FHE crypto schemes and libraries available. An important shortcoming for
most of them is that they only support integers. CKKS, recently presented by Cheon et al. [4], allows
for computation over real numbers. Its security is based on the ring learning with error problem.
CKKS supports multiplication and addition of encrypted cihpertexts. To encrypt a plaintext p it
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must first be encoded. The encoding is given as m(X) ∈ R := Z[X ]/(Xn+1) with m(X) =
⌊∆ · φ−1(p)⌉ ∈ R where∆ > 1 is the scaling factor. To encrypt the encoded plaintext, we need to
sample some error polynomials and add them to the plaintext polynomial. With an initial modulus q
the secret key can be chosen as sk = (1, s) ∈ R2
q
; s being sampled from a distribution overR. For
the public key we first need an error distribution Xe over R. Using a sampled uniform randomly
fromR2
q
and e sampled fromXe, the public key can be constructed as pk = (b = −a·s+e, a) ∈ R
2
q
.
To encrypt an encoded plaintext m, we need to sample two error polynomials e0, e1 from an error
distribution overR. The encryption is given as ctxt = (c0 = r · b+ e0 +m, c1 = r · a+ e1) ∈ R
2
q
.
On the encrypted values we can perform addition and multiplication. During these operations the
scaling factor is updated and later used during decryption to rescale the decoded values correctly.
2.2 Polynomial Approximation in Neural Networks
Neural networks rely on activation functions to introduce non-linearity. One of the most common
activation functions is ReLU which is given as f(x) = max(x, 0). Other popular functions include
Tanh and Sigmoid. The problem with all these functions is that they can not be computed over
encrypted data since they rely on operations such as comparison or division that are not supported
by HE schemes. Xie et al. [6] introduced the idea to approximate the activation functions with
low degree polynomials. We adopt Hesamifard et al. [4] approach which improves on the idea by
approximating the derivative of the activation function and integrate over the approximation to get
the a substitute activation function.
3 Experimental Results
In this section, we present results of implementing neural networks over encrypted data. We used
IBM’s HElib library [12] and Cheon-Kim- Kim-Song (CKKS) [13] encryption scheme for imple-
mentation.
3.1 Network Architecture and Dataset
The data we use in our experiments is from the Cars Overhead With Context (COWC) dataset [11].
It consists of 32 by 32 color images which represent an overhead view containing a car or not. The
training set includes 911924 instances and the test set has 76754 instances. We train a CNN inspired
by AlexNet [10] but we make some adjustments to account for input size. As shown in Table 1,
the network consists of four convolutional layers, 4 average pooling layers and 3 fully connected
layers. Zero padding layers where included where necessary. We add an activation layer after every
convolutional layer and fully connected layer. The activation after the last fully connected layer is
Sigmoid. All other activation layers use a polynomial of degree two 0.000469841857369822x2 +
0.500000000000008x that approximates ReLU.
3.2 Results: Neural Network Inference over Encrypted Data
Once the polynomial approximations are calculated for ReLU, we replace the activation functions
in the neural network with polynomial approximations and analyze the performance of the neural
network. We first train the network architecture described in Table 1 using GPU implementation.
We split the dataset into 80% training and 20% validation. We then train the network for 12 epochs,
with 4 different scenarios: the original network with only ReLU activation functions, the network
with only polynomial activation functions, the network that switches from ReLU to polynomials at
the 8th epoch, and the network with uses approximations for mean pooling in addition to activation
functions. We achieved accuracy of 99.71% for ReLU only, 97.94% for polynomials only, and about
95% for the network with approximations for activation functions and mean pooling layer. These
results confirm the network performance for HE-compatible structures.
Once the network is trained, we test it on unseen encrypted test data. We run the test data on our
model encrypted and unencrypted to get comparable time measurements. As expected, running over
encrypted data comes with heavy computational cost. We ran several encrypted images through
the network and measured the average inference time. For this test, we used a machine with 56GB
of RAM and an Intel(R) Xeon(R) E5-2623 v3 at 3.00GHz CPU. For an 8 image batch, it took
4333.2 seconds over encrypted data for classification which is about 9 minutes per image. We can
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Table 1: Architecture of our CNN for the COW-C dataset.
Layer Type Parameters
1 2D Convolutinal 96 filters, 11x11 size, 1x1 stride, padding
2 Activation
3 Average Pooling 2D pool size 2x2
4 2D Convolutinal 256 filters, 5x5 size, 1x1 stride, padding
5 Activation
6 Average Pooling 2D pool size 2x2
7 Zero Padding 2D symmetric 1 pixel padding
8 2D Convolutinal 384 filters, 3x3 size, 1x1 stride, padding
9 Activation
10 Average Pooling 2D pool size 2x2
11 Zero Padding 2D symmetric 1 pixel padding
12 2D Convolutinal 384 filters, 3x3 size, 1x1 stride, padding
13 Activation
14 Zero Padding 2D symmetric 1 pixel padding
15 Average Pooling 2D pool size 2x2
16 Fully Connected 4096 units
17 Activation
18 Fully Connected 4096 units
19 Activation
20 Fully Connected 1 unit
21 Sigmoid Activation
potentially use larger batch sizes which will in turn improve the time per image but that requires
larger memory size.
3.3 GPU Results
In order to improve performance of the proposed approach, we investigated and developed means
of performing GPU-accelerated HE operations on encrypted floating point numbers. Our approach
for doing this can be summarized as: (1) convert floating point numbers to an array of integers;
(2) encrypt those integers; and (3) use Boolean circuits to perform arithmetic operations on the
encrypted arrays. We measured several timings including: (1) number of Boolean circuits required
for each arithmetic operation; (2) the overall timing for each operation for both CPUs and GPUs;
and (3) reduction in time by adding GPUs. We used a GPU Titan V with 80 cores for all experiments
and we were able to achieve more than 10000 times speed up on add operation and more than 4500
times speed up on multiply operation. We also performed experiments with different number of
GPU cores (10, 20, 40) to examine its effect of performance; the results show that we get near linear
speed up by increasing the number of GPU cores.
Our goal was to validate that GPU-enabled frameworks achieve significant speed increases over
their corresponding CPU counterparts which was confirmed by our experiments. We are currently
working on extending our GPU-based implementation to include the entire FHE-compatible CNN
structures.
4 Conclusion
In this paper, we presented an FHE-compatible CNN that is able to classify the homomorphically
encrypted images for a complex CNN and a large dataset. The main goal was to show that privacy-
preserving deep learning with FHE can be significantly accelerated with GPUs. We implemented
a CNN architecture similar to AlexNet and performed experiments with the Cars Overhead With
Context (COWC) dataset. To the best of our knowledge, it is the first time such a complex network
and large dataset are evaluated on encrypted data. Our approach achieved accuracy of 95% and
our results show that we could achieve more tan 4500 times speed up when we implement GPU-
accelerated FHE operations on encrypted data.
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